British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61424/bjhss.v3i2.1092
Date Published Online: October 27, 2026
Journal Homepage: https://bluemarkpublishers.com/index.php/BJHSS

BJHSS
BLUEMARK PUBLISHERS

| RESEARCH ARTICLE

Labour and the State in Zambia: Trade Union–State Relations from Colonial Copperbelt to the Multi-Party Era, and Their Legacy for Unionised Workers in Livingstone

Africa K. Musonda
Assistant Director, Human Resource and Administration, Lusaka City Council, Zambia
Corresponding Author: Africa K. Musonda, **E-mail**: africamrejoice@gmail.com

| ABSTRACT

This article examines how relations between organised labour and the state shaped trade unionism in Zambia, from the colonial era to the return of multi-party politics in 1991 and after, and asks how that history is reflected in the experience of unionised workers today. It combines a documentary analysis of recent historical and political-economy scholarship (2020–2026) with a 2025 survey of 170 unionised workers in Livingstone, Southern Province. Three arguments are advanced. First, Zambian unionism developed under a colonial state that repressed African worker organisation, favoured depoliticised unions and sustained racially differentiated labour relations. Second, after independence the state sought to subordinate labour, replacing the old federation in 1965 with an appointed Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), co-opting it in the 1980s and then confronting it when it resisted, although unions were never as firmly incorporated as in some other one-party regimes. Third, the alliance between the ZCTU and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) delivered political victory but not durable labour autonomy: the former ZCTU leader became president, pursued privatisation, and unions entered what has been described as a second period of taming. Survey evidence suggests that this history persists as an institutional legacy. Respondents agreed, on average, that financial weakness, leadership, union size, management attitudes, lack of statutory support, illiteracy among members, multiplicity of unions and politicisation constrain their unions, and 73.5 per cent said these challenges adversely affect union performance. Two-thirds (67.1 per cent) said their union does not represent them well in bargaining, and 54.1 per cent gave mandatory membership as their reason for joining. These findings echo recent studies of Zambian local-council and teacher unions. The article concludes that present-day weaknesses in Zambian unions cannot be separated from a long pattern of political entanglement with the state, and that rebuilding union autonomy requires legal protection, internal democracy and financial independence.

| KEYWORDS

Trade unions; state–labour relations; Zambia; ZCTU; union autonomy; democratic transition

| ARTICLE INFORMATION

ACCEPTED: September 12, 2026 **PUBLISHED:** October 27, 2026 **DOI:** https://doi.org/10.61424/bjhss.v3i2.1092

1. Introduction

The Zambian labour movement has been a powerful force in national life, rooted especially in the Copperbelt mining sector (Musić & Harisch, 2026). Few African labour movements have been as closely bound up with national politics. Frederick Chiluba, who led the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), became president of the Republic after the 1991 election (Musić & Harisch, 2026), and the one-party state of the United National Independence Party

Copyright: © 2026 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC- BY-NC-SA) License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/), published by Bluemark Publishers.

(UNIP), declared in 1973, never fully crushed civil society organisations such as trade unions (Namukombo & Kamata, 2024).

That history raises a question that is as much sociological as it is political. When a labour movement is born in struggle against an unequal order, regulated by the state that follows it, and then allied with a party that captures state power, what becomes of its capacity to act as an independent representative of workers? Comparative scholarship on Africa frames this as a question of union autonomy, a union's ability to avoid capture by the state, capital or other powerful actors, and of influence, its ability to shape or block policy (Sha, 2024). Zambia offers a well-documented case spanning colonial, one-party and multi-party regimes.

Recent scholarship has enriched the picture. Musonda (2025), writing on the mine unions, distinguishes four stages of Zambian union history, namely militancy marked by internal divisions (1949–1964), initial taming (1965–1974), revival (1974–1990) and a second taming from 1991, and argues that the latter produced a "safety-first unionism" that avoids confrontation. Harisch and Musić (2024) and Musić and Harisch (2026), drawing on archives in Lusaka, Belgrade and Bonn, document the relationship between unions, the colonial state and UNIP in the late colonial and one-party periods. Most of this literature, however, concerns mining and the Copperbelt.

This article makes two contributions. First, it reconstructs the main phases of union–state relations in Zambia, from colonial labour control, through the post-independence period of an appointed and then elected ZCTU, to the confrontation between UNIP and the ZCTU in the 1980s and the MMD's accession to power in 1991. Second, it links that history to the present by drawing on survey evidence from unionised workers in Livingstone, asking whether workers' contemporary assessments of their unions echo the structural problems that history would lead us to expect. The article is guided by three questions:

- How did colonial and post-independence states in Zambia seek to shape, incorporate or contain trade unionism?
- What was the nature of the relationship between the ZCTU, UNIP and the MMD, and what were its consequences for union autonomy?
- How do unionised workers in Livingstone assess the constraints on their unions, and are these assessments consistent with the historical legacy?

The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the conceptual background. Section 3 describes the methods. Section 4 presents the historical analysis and the survey results. Section 5 discusses their implications, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framing

2.1 Autonomy, incorporation and influence

The central concept in this article is union autonomy: the capacity of a labour organisation to define its own goals, choose its own leaders and manage its own resources free of state or party direction. Sha (2024) operationalises it together with influence, deriving a four-level typology that runs from low autonomy and low influence to high autonomy and high influence. Autonomy, on his definition, is a union's ability to avoid capture by the state, capital or powerful non-state actors; influence is its ability to shape policy or block harmful policy (Sha, 2024).

Sha (2024) also identifies a recurring African pattern. Unions that fought alongside liberation movements often became part of post-independence governments, which built inclusion but could weaken their ability to press those governments and breed distrust between leaders and members. Unions that sponsor candidates or form parties do not always carry workers with them, and some unionist politicians later adopt anti-labour positions. Abstaining from party politics protects autonomy but may reduce influence (Sha, 2024). Mutema (2023) similarly observes that union–state relations remain under-studied in Africa despite their importance for employment relations, and uses Zimbabwe to examine unions as civil-society actors and the question of political alliances.

2.2 Frames of reference

Frames of reference remain central to the study of employment relations, even though few studies have tried to extend them (Barry & Wilkinson, 2021). Three are relevant here. A unitarist frame treats the organisation as a team with shared interests, in which unions appear unnecessary or disruptive. A pluralist frame accepts that groups have

different interests and treats collective bargaining as the means of reconciling them. Marxist and radical frames locate conflict in the structure of the employment relationship itself (Barry & Wilkinson, 2021). Barry and Wilkinson (2021) ask whether these traditional frames still explain how employers and employees perceive and act, and argue that revisiting them is timely given changes in work and employment.

The Zambian record does not fit neatly into any one frame. Arguably, the party's wish to bring unions under its influence reflected a unitarist impulse that treated independent worker organisation as a problem to be managed. Union leaders in the 1980s behaved in line with pluralism, demanding recognition as a legitimate interest group and rejecting arrangements in which they feared being sidelined (Musić & Harisch, 2026). A radical reading helps to explain the exploitative conditions in which unionism was born. It is the pluralist frame, with its emphasis on bargaining within a regulated framework, that makes the question of union autonomy most pressing.

2.3 Unions, the state and members in Zambia

A growing literature examines how Zambian unions operate inside and outside the state. Musonda (2025) argues that unions weakened by economic liberalisation and mine privatisation adopted a "safety-first unionism" that lets weak, shrinking unions still win some gains through avoiding confrontation, investing resources and expanding membership services. In a study of local councils in Lusaka Province, Madimutsa and Gwasupika (2025) find that unions have become less militant in wage negotiations and have shifted toward member services such as funeral grants, medical support and loans, which they interpret as a co-optation that keeps workers working despite poor conditions. Kabika et al. (2020), studying teacher unions in Lusaka, report that unions were effective at legal representation and collective bargaining but that these efforts did not translate into conditions of service that improved teachers' welfare. Kapesea and McNamara (2020) show that, in the mining unions, local cultural norms and union norms shape each other, with the values of dominant ethnic groups influencing union policy and limiting some members' participation.

2.4 Research gap

Recent historical work has extended the record of Zambian union–state relations in both directions (Harisch & Musić, 2024; Musić & Harisch, 2026; Musonda, 2025), but it concentrates on the mining sector and the Copperbelt, where unions are large and politically prominent. Studies of local-council and teacher unions (Kabika et al., 2020; Madimutsa & Gwasupika, 2025) document member dissatisfaction but do not situate it in the long history of state–labour relations. Little work connects the two by asking how workers in a provincial town experience the consequences of that history. This article addresses the gap by pairing a historical reconstruction with evidence from Livingstone.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research design

The study uses a two-part design. The first part is a documentary historical analysis of recent scholarship on labour and politics in Northern Rhodesia and Zambia. To keep the literature current, the analysis draws on works published between 2020 and 2026: historical and political-economy studies (Harisch and Musić, 2024; Money, 2021; Musić & Harisch, 2026; Musonda, 2025; Namukombo & Kamata, 2024), comparative African scholarship (Mutema, 2023; Sha, 2024) and studies of unions in Zambian schools and local councils (Kabika et al., 2020; Kapesea & McNamara, 2020; Madimutsa & Gwasupika, 2025). Sources were read for evidence about state strategies toward labour, union responses and institutional change, and were organised into four periods: the colonial period to 1964; the early post-independence period from 1965; the period of co-optation and confrontation in the 1980s and the transition of 1990–1991; and the period after 1991.

The second part is a descriptive cross-sectional survey designed to examine contemporary workers' views of their unions. A descriptive survey is suited to documenting perceptions, beliefs and attitudes across a defined population.

3.2 Study site, population and sample

The survey was conducted in Livingstone, Southern Province, a town with many trade unions and union members. The target population was approximately 640 unionised employees, drawn from the Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union (ZULAWU; 100 members), the Fire Services Union of Zambia (FIRESUZ; 39 members) and

Secondary Teachers' Union of Zambia (SESTUZ; 501 members). Using Yamane's formula, $n = N / [1 + N(e)^2]$, with N = 640 and a 5 per cent margin of error, the required sample was 246. Respondents were selected by simple random sampling to limit pre-conceived selection. Of the 246 questionnaires distributed, 170 were returned, a response rate of 69 per cent. Data from the same survey are also analysed, using multiple regression, in a separate article by the author on the relationship between union culture and union effectiveness, which is being submitted to another journal; the two articles ask different questions and report different analyses.

3.3 Instrument and analysis

Data were collected with a semi-structured, self-administered questionnaire developed by the researcher and distributed in person. Attitudinal items were measured on a five-point Likert scale, scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), so that lower mean scores indicate stronger agreement. The questionnaire was piloted before the main survey. Data were coded and analysed in SPSS version 20 using frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations. The analysis in this article is limited to descriptive statistics, since the aim is to characterise workers' assessments of the constraints on unions rather than to test causal relationships.

3.4 Ethical considerations

Respondents were informed that the study was for academic purposes, that their participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw without penalty, and that their responses would be treated confidentially. To protect confidentiality, age was collected in ranges rather than as exact values.

3.5 Respondent profile

Of the 170 respondents, 110 (64.7 per cent) were male, 59 (34.7 per cent) were female and one did not state gender. The largest age group was 21–30 years (59 respondents), followed by 31–40 years (54), 41–50 years (25) and over 50 (19); four were under 21 and nine did not state their age. A little over two in five (42.9 per cent) held a Grade 12 certificate, 28.8 per cent a diploma, 20.0 per cent a bachelor's degree, and 2.4 per cent a master's degree or professional qualification; 5.9 per cent did not respond. Most respondents (92 per cent) held permanent jobs and 7 per cent were on contract. The sample therefore consists mainly of younger and mid-career permanent public-sector employees.

4. Results

4.1 Colonial origins: repression, depoliticisation and racial differentiation

Labour organisation on the Copperbelt was racially divided from the outset. White mineworkers built a powerful union of their own: from 1940 a wave of strikes won them major improvements in pay and conditions and a colour bar, and by 1941 their union had imposed a closed shop, all without the colonial state compelling the mining companies to pay higher wages (Money, 2021). The state and the companies, nonetheless, mistrusted and closely monitored white mineworkers (Money, 2021). African workers faced a different relationship with the state.

Harisch and Musić (2024) report that after a 1956 mineworkers' strike the colonial government declared a state of emergency and arrested officials of the African Mineworkers' Union, while the Colonial Office, the British Trades Union Congress and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions favoured keeping unions separate from politics. Radical officials who argued that unions should join the anti-colonial struggle were at the centre of a split: the expelled unions formed the Reformed Trades Union Congress in 1960, openly aligned with UNIP, and the rival bodies reunited as the United Trades Union Congress in 1961. Many union leaders became UNIP members, and unions folded workers' demands on wages, housing and Africanisation into the nationalist programme under UNIP's guidance, although some officials preferred unions independent of parties (Harisch & Musić, 2024). Musonda (2025) characterises 1949–1964 as a period of militancy marked by internal divisions. The colonial inheritance was therefore a movement that had been repressed when it was industrial, encouraged to stay out of politics, and then drawn into nationalist politics at the point of transition.

4.2 Early post-independence: an appointed federation and a party that wanted control

After independence the state did not leave labour to organise itself. Harisch and Musić (2024) note that UNIP sought to subordinate labour, an effort that intensified after independence. In 1965 the government replaced the old federation with a centralised ZCTU whose first president was government-appointed; rank-and-file members could elect their own leaders only from 1967 (Musić & Harisch, 2026). UNIP wanted to bring unions under party

influence, and unions resisted, fearing that they would be sidelined in tripartite bargaining (Musić & Harisch, 2026). Musonda (2025) labels 1965–1974 a period of initial taming and 1974–1990 one of revival.

Participation schemes illustrate the gap between rhetoric and practice. Works councils were legislated in 1971 under the Industrial Relations Act and implemented from 1976, but surveys cited by Musić and Harisch (2026) found that workers did not feel they took part in decisions, and unions and employers were both wary of the arrangement. The one-party state itself, declared in 1973, never fully crushed civil society organisations such as trade unions (Namukombo & Kamata, 2024), and Musić and Harisch (2026) note that Zambia never incorporated its unions as firmly as some other one-party regimes did. These arrangements were double-edged: a national federation and legal recognition gave unions reach and standing, but appointed leadership, party pressure and participation schemes that did not deliver meant that they operated under constant pressure to conform to the party's goals.

4.3 Co-optation and confrontation in the 1980s

The 1980s show the state using co-optation first and confrontation second. Co-optation. In 1983 the ZCTU accepted seats on the boards of the parastatal holding company ZIMCO, reportedly because of pressure, perks and a wish to shape participation (Musić & Harisch, 2026). The decision backfired: the ZCTU withdrew in 1985 amid accusations of betrayal by its members, and its opposition to the government hardened after that (Musić & Harisch, 2026).

Confrontation and delegitimation. In 1986 the ZCTU openly opposed the ILO/UNDP self-management pilot. President Kaunda responded by blaming foreign influence and expelling the representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Musić & Harisch, 2026). Taken together, these episodes show a state that used party-state structures, inducements and ideological accusation in combination, and a federation that, having accepted incorporation, learned its costs and resisted. They fit the stage that Musonda (2025) describes as revival, in which unions regained militancy and independence after the first period of taming.

4.4 Transition and after: political victory without durable autonomy

The one-party state lasted until October 1991, when Chiluba won the election under the MMD (Namukombo & Kamata, 2024). Chiluba, the former ZCTU leader, then pursued privatisation (Musić & Harisch, 2026). Musonda (2025) describes the period from 1991 as a second taming of the unions that produced a "safety-first unionism": weak and shrinking unions avoided confrontation, invested resources and expanded membership services in order to secure some gains for members.

This article reads these developments as a paradox. The labour movement's most important political goal, an end to one-party rule, was achieved through an alliance with the party that then governed, and this closeness may have left the movement without a credible independent position once the party held power. That interpretation goes beyond what the cited sources state and would need confirmation from detailed study of the early MMD period, but it is consistent with the pattern that Sha (2024) describes across Africa, in which unions that become part of governments gain inclusion but can lose capacity to press those governments, and with the later retreat from confrontation documented by Musonda (2025).

4.5 The contemporary legacy: evidence from Livingstone

Do these historical patterns leave traces in the way unionised workers in a provincial town assess their unions today? Table 1 presents respondents' views on eight challenges facing trade unions. All eight mean scores fell between 2.14 and 2.79, on the agree side of the scale midpoint, indicating that respondents on average agreed that each was a challenge. Financial weakness (M = 2.14) and leadership (M = 2.31) were rated most strongly; politicisation of the union (M = 2.79) and multiplicity of unions (M = 2.78) were rated least strongly, but were still, on average, endorsed. Almost three-quarters of respondents (125 of 170; 73.5 per cent) said that these challenges adversely affect union performance, while 45 (26.5 per cent) said they do not.

Table 1. *Respondents' views on challenges facing trade unions (N = 170)*

Challenge	M	SD
Financial weakness	2.14	1.227
Leadership	2.31	1.419
Size of union	2.45	1.523
Management attitude	2.52	1.283
Illiteracy and ignorance of members	2.66	1.296
Lack of statutory support	2.70	1.557
Multiplicity of trade unions	2.78	1.401
Politicisation of the union	2.79	1.415

Note. Items were scored from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree); lower means indicate stronger agreement that the item is a challenge. Source: survey data, 2025.

Table 2 summarises indicators of membership and representation. Nearly all respondents (91.2 per cent) were union members and 87.6 per cent said they understood the role of their union. Yet two-thirds (67.1 per cent) said that their union does not represent them well when bargaining. More than half (54.1 per cent) gave mandatory membership at their workplace as the reason they had joined, compared with 34.7 per cent who cited a belief in collectivism and 11.2 per cent who cited family influence. When asked directly, however, 64.1 per cent said that their organisation does not force members to join and 35.9 per cent said it does. This apparent tension suggests that many workers experience union membership as a workplace norm that is taken for granted, rather than as an explicit order.

Table 2. *Indicators of union membership and representation (N = 170)*

Indicator	n	%
Member of a union	155	91.2
Understands the role of the union	149	87.6
Union does *not* represent them well in bargaining	114	67.1
Reason for joining: membership is mandatory at workplace	92	54.1
Reason for joining: belief in collectivism	59	34.7
Reason for joining: influence of family	19	11.2
Organisation forces members to join (yes)	61	35.9
Challenges adversely affect union performance (yes)	125	73.5

Note. Source: survey data, 2025.

5. Discussion

5.1 Repression, subordination and co-optation

The historical record reveals a recurring logic. Under colonial rule the state repressed industrial militancy, as after the 1956 strike, encouraged unions to stay out of politics, and sustained a racially differentiated system in which white and African workers organised separately (Harisch & Musić, 2024; Money, 2021). After independence the state moved from keeping unions out of politics to subordinating them to the party: it created the ZCTU in 1965, appointed its first president and pressed for party influence (Harisch & Musić, 2024; Musić & Harisch, 2026). In the 1980s it tried inducements, in the form of board seats, before turning to confrontation when the federation resisted (Musić & Harisch, 2026). Each phase used a different instrument, but the aim was consistent: to keep organised labour manageable. At the same time, the record shows that unions were never wholly incorporated, since they

resisted board participation, opposed the self-management pilot and, in Musonda's (2025) terms, experienced a revival between 1974 and 1990.

5.2 The paradox of the democratic transition

The most striking feature of the historical analysis is that the labour movement's greatest political success preceded what Musonda (2025) calls a second taming. A federation whose leader became president (Musić & Harisch, 2026) entered a period in which unions adopted a defensive, service-oriented "safety-first" strategy (Musonda, 2025). It is the pattern that Sha (2024) identifies across Africa, where unions that fight alongside liberation or opposition movements become part of governments, which brings inclusion but can weaken their capacity to press those governments and breed distrust between leaders and members. The Zambian case therefore supports the argument that democratic transitions open space for labour but do not by themselves secure autonomy.

5.3 Reading the Livingstone evidence

The survey results should be interpreted with care, for they describe perceptions at one point in time and cannot by themselves demonstrate historical causation. Nevertheless, they resemble findings from other recent Zambian studies. In local councils in Lusaka Province, Madimutsa and Gwasupika (2025) report that unions have limited funds, that most of the 100 workers they surveyed were dissatisfied with member services because of inadequate services, difficult access, management interference and lack of member consultation, and that unions are best understood as co-opted into maintaining workplace peace. Kabika et al. (2020) similarly find that teacher unions were effective in legal representation and collective bargaining but did not secure conditions of service that improved members' welfare. In Livingstone, respondents also ranked financial weakness and leadership as the most serious constraints and two-thirds said their union does not represent them well in bargaining.

Three patterns in the Livingstone data are consistent with the historical legacy. First, the prominence of financial weakness and leadership echoes the dependence and vulnerability described by Madimutsa and Gwasupika (2025) and the retreat into service provision described by Musonda (2025). Second, politicisation and lack of statutory support, though ranked lower than financial and leadership problems, were still endorsed on average, and responses on lack of statutory support were the most widely spread (SD = 1.557), suggesting that experiences differ across unions and workplaces. Third, the finding that two-thirds of members believe their union does not represent them well in bargaining, while a majority joined because membership was mandatory, points to a gap between formal membership and active, voluntary commitment. When membership is experienced as a workplace norm and not as a free choice, leaders may have less incentive to be accountable to their members, and members less reason to engage.

The ranking of politicisation near the bottom of the list also deserves comment. One possible interpretation is that members now experience political interference less as an episodic confrontation with government, as in the 1980s, and more as an embedded condition that is part of the background of union life. This reading is tentative and would need qualitative research to test.

5.4 Implications

For policy, the analysis suggests that strengthening unions requires more than expanding legal rights. Protection against interference needs to be accompanied by arrangements that reduce financial dependence, such as transparent member-based financing, and by internal reforms that make leaders accountable to members. Research on Zambian mining unions also suggests that internal culture matters: Kapesea and McNamara (2020) show that kinship and the values of dominant ethnic groups shaped union policy and limited some members' participation, a reminder that reform needs to address how unions operate internally and not only how they relate to the state. For scholarship, the Zambian case underscores the value of connecting the long history of state labour relations to contemporary studies of union effectiveness, rather than treating them as separate fields.

6. Conclusion

This article has traced the relationship between organised labour and the state in Zambia from the colonial Copperbelt through the early post-independence period, the co-optation and confrontation of the 1980s, and the MMD's accession to power, and has linked that history to the views of 170 unionised workers in Livingstone. Its

main conclusion is that the effectiveness problems of Zambian unions today have deep institutional roots in a long pattern of political entanglement with the state. Colonial authorities repressed and sought to depoliticise union activity; the post-independence state subordinated the labour federation, then co-opted and confronted it; and the democratic transition, while it brought a former labour leader to the presidency, was followed by a second period of taming rather than by secure autonomy. Survey evidence is consistent with this account: respondents agreed that financial weakness, weak leadership and lack of statutory support constrain their unions, believed these constraints harm union performance, and mostly doubted that their union represents them well in bargaining.

The study has limitations. The historical analysis is based on a deliberately current but therefore selective body of literature published between 2020 and 2026, much of it concerned with the mining sector, so that earlier primary research and archival work are represented only through these recent studies; further archival and oral-history research would strengthen it. The survey was conducted in one town with members of a limited number of unions, used a questionnaire developed for the study, and reports only descriptive statistics; its findings cannot be generalised to all Zambian unions. Some respondents may also have been sceptical about the study or may have exaggerated certain responses. Future research could compare the experience of unions in the mining, local-government and education sectors, examine how legislative and economic changes after 1991 affected union autonomy, and use interviews with union leaders and members to explore how workers understand the relationship between their unions and political parties.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Publisher's Note: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Use Disclosure: The authors declare that no artificial intelligence tools were used in the preparation of this manuscript.

References

[1] Barry, M., & Wilkinson, A. (2021). Old frames and new lenses: Frames of reference revisited. *Journal of Industrial Relations, 63*(2), 114–125. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185620983968

[2] Harisch, I. R., & Musić, G. (2024). Workers' proto-diplomacy: Early contacts between Zambian and Yugoslav trade unions, 1959–1962. *International Review of Social History, 69*(3), 411–438. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859024000622

[3] Kabika, K. M., Simuyaba, E., Haambokoma, N., & Mwewa, G. (2020). Re-examining the role of teacher trade unions in promoting welfare and sustained livelihood for their members: A case of teacher trade unions in Lusaka, Zambia. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 4*(12), 122–130. https://doi.org/10.47772/ijriss.2020.41207

[4] Kapesea, R., & McNamara, T. (2020). 'We are not just a union, we are a family': Class, kinship and tribe in Zambia's mining unions. *Dialectical Anthropology, 44*(2), 153–172. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-019-09578-x

[5] Madimutsa, C., & Gwasupika, J. (2025). Trade unions, member services, and pacification of workers in local councils in Zambia. *African Journal of Sociology, Psychology and Rural Studies, 5*(1), 45–63. https://doi.org/10.31920/2752-6585/2025/v5n1a2

[6] Money, D. (2021). *White mineworkers on Zambia's Copperbelt, 1926–74: In a class of their own*. Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004467347

[7] Musić, G., & Harisch, I. R. (2026). Industrial participatory democracy: A 'paper tiger' of the Zambian one-party state and its transnational entanglements. In A. Kladnik (Ed.), *Visions and practices of democracy in socialist and post-colonial states* (pp. 351–378). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07773-8_14

[8] Musonda, J. (2025). Safety-first unionism: The case of Zambian mine unions. *Third World Quarterly, 46*(4), 486–503. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2025.2484603

[9] Mutema, Z. (2023). Union-state relations in Zimbabwe: An assessment of the changing relationship between trade unions and the state. In C. Mordi, H. A. Ajonbadi, & O. D. Adekoya (Eds.), *Employee relations and trade unions in Africa* (pp. 49–70). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26825-0_3

[10] Namukombo, J., & Kamata, N. (2024). Dissent and opposition to one party system in Zambia: Was it ideological? *Zambia Journal of History, 11*(1), 67–89.

[11] Sha, D. P. (2024). Trade unions, politics and the state in Africa. In M. Mwamadzingo, H. Mote, D. P. Sha, & S. Bellucci (Eds.), *African trade unions and the future of work: Responses, challenges and opportunities* (pp. 7–26). International Labour Organization.