Why Anti-Corruption Reforms Succeed or Fail: An Institutional Analysis in Bangladesh

Abstract

Anti-corruption reform has been widely practiced in developing nations, but the reforms have not been effective enough in the reduction of corrupt practices, as seen in Bangladesh. This paper explores the reasons behind the success of certain reforms and the failure of others through the application of a qualitative institutional analysis by discussing the relationship between regulatory, normative, and cognitive institutional aspects. Government reports, policy documents, academic and media investigations were used to gather data, and thematical analysis of the data was performed to identify patterns affecting the outcome of reforms. The results indicate that commitment to leadership, digital transparency, and international accountability pressures are beneficial to improve the effectiveness of reform, and political interference, bureaucratic resistance, and lack of enforcement are negative factors that reduce success. Reforms do well when the formal policies are in line with the institutional capacity, administrative support, and socio-political legitimacy. The theoretical contribution of this study is the application of the institutional theory in explaining an uneven reform performance, and the practical contribution in terms of governance approaches that can enhance anti-corruption efforts in a setting where political and administrative bottlenecks are predetermined.