
| RESEARCH ARTICLE

The New Frontier of Financial Crime: Navigating the Dual-Use Dilemma of Generative AI

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| ABSTRACT

This study examines the dual-use nature of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in financial crime, where the same technologies that enhance fraud detection also enable sophisticated criminal activities. Through a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative analysis of financial crime data from 2018-2024 and qualitative expert interviews, this research investigates how generative AI functions as both a defensive tool and an offensive weapon in the financial sector. The findings reveal that while AI-powered systems have improved fraud detection rates by approximately 65%, they have simultaneously enabled a 700% increase in deepfake-related financial crimes. The study contributes to the emerging literature on AI ethics and financial security by proposing a framework for managing the dual-use dilemma, emphasizing the need for proactive governance, international cooperation, and adaptive regulatory responses. The research demonstrates that effective mitigation requires not just technological solutions but also comprehensive policy frameworks that can evolve with rapidly advancing AI capabilities.

| KEYWORDS

Generative AI, Financial Crime, Dual-Use Technology, Fraud Detection, Deepfakes, Machine Learning, Financial Security, Regulatory Governance, Anti-Money Laundering, Cybercrime

| ARTICLE INFORMATION

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1. Introduction

The rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has fundamentally transformed the landscape of financial services, creating unprecedented opportunities for both innovation and exploitation. As financial institutions increasingly adopt AI technologies to enhance their fraud detection capabilities and streamline operations, malicious actors simultaneously leverage these same technologies to perpetrate increasingly sophisticated financial crimes (Chen & Magramo, 2024). This dual-use nature of AI technology presents a complex challenge that requires urgent attention from researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.

Recent incidents highlight the severity of this challenge. In February 2024, an employee at a multinational firm was defrauded of over \$25 million through a deepfake video call that convincingly impersonated the company's chief financial officer (Vlasto, 2024). This case exemplifies how generative AI has evolved from a theoretical threat to a present reality, enabling criminals to execute large-scale fraudulent schemes with unprecedented sophistication and success rates.

The financial sector faces a particularly acute version of the dual-use dilemma because the same machine learning algorithms that power fraud detection systems can be repurposed to create synthetic identities, generate

convincing phishing content, and automate large-scale financial crimes (Narasimha, 2024). This creates an arms race dynamic where defensive and offensive capabilities advance in parallel, requiring financial institutions to continuously adapt their security measures while simultaneously benefiting from AI's operational efficiencies.

1.2 Significance of the Study

This research addresses a critical gap in the literature by systematically examining the dual-use nature of generative AI in financial crime. While previous studies have focused on either the benefits of AI in fraud detection or the threats posed by AI-enabled crimes, few have comprehensively analyzed the interconnected relationship between these dual applications and their implications for financial security governance.

The significance of this study is underscored by the rapid escalation of AI-enabled financial crimes. According to recent industry surveys, 97% of financial institutions reported losses to AI-based threats in 2023, with 51% losing between \$5 million and \$25 million (BioCatch, 2024). These figures demonstrate that the dual-use challenge is not merely theoretical but represents a clear and present danger to global financial stability.

Furthermore, this research contributes to the broader discourse on AI governance by providing empirical evidence and practical frameworks for managing dual-use technologies in high-stakes environments. The findings have implications beyond the financial sector, offering insights relevant to healthcare, telecommunications, and other industries grappling with similar technological dilemmas.

1.3 Problem Statement

The central problem addressed by this research is the paradoxical nature of generative AI in financial crime prevention and perpetration. While AI technologies have demonstrated significant potential in enhancing fraud detection capabilities, they simultaneously enable criminals to execute more sophisticated and scalable attacks. This creates a complex governance challenge where the same technological advances that strengthen defensive capabilities also amplify offensive threats.

Current regulatory frameworks and security protocols were designed for traditional financial crimes and are inadequate for addressing AI-enabled threats. The speed and scale at which AI can generate synthetic content, create fake identities, and automate fraudulent activities exceed the capacity of existing detection and response mechanisms (Saeidi, 2024). This creates systemic vulnerabilities that threaten not only individual financial institutions but the broader financial ecosystem.

The problem is further complicated by the global nature of both AI development and financial crime. Criminals can leverage AI tools developed in one jurisdiction to commit crimes in another, while regulatory responses remain fragmented across national boundaries. This creates arbitrage opportunities for malicious actors and undermines the effectiveness of localized security measures.

2. Literature Review

The literature on artificial intelligence and financial crime has evolved rapidly over the past decade, reflecting the accelerating pace of technological development and its impact on financial security. Early research focused primarily on the potential benefits of AI in fraud detection, with scholars emphasizing machine learning's capacity to identify patterns and anomalies in large datasets (Rouhollahi et al., 2021). However, recent studies have increasingly acknowledged the dual-use nature of these technologies and their potential for malicious applications.

Garcia-Segura (2024) provides a comprehensive analysis of AI's role in corporate crime prevention, highlighting how advanced data analysis and predictive analytics are revolutionizing fraud detection. The research demonstrates that AI systems can process vast volumes of transactional data to identify malicious activities with unprecedented accuracy and speed. However, the study also acknowledges the ethical and privacy concerns surrounding AI deployment, noting the need for balanced approaches that protect individual rights while enhancing security.

The emergence of generative AI has fundamentally shifted the landscape of financial crime research. King et al. (2024) conducted one of the first systematic studies of AI-enabled financial crimes, finding that the same large language models used for customer service can be weaponized to create convincing phishing emails and social engineering attacks. Their research revealed that criminals are adapting AI technologies faster than defensive measures can be implemented, creating an asymmetric advantage for malicious actors.

Bag (2024) examined the intersection of AI and anti-money laundering efforts, arguing that while AI has emerged as a promising solution to compliance inefficiencies, its implementation requires careful consideration of regulatory frameworks and risk management protocols. The study emphasizes that AI's effectiveness in combating financial crime depends not only on technological capabilities but also on institutional capacity and governance structures.

The dual-use nature of AI technology has been explored in the broader cybersecurity literature, with researchers noting that the same algorithms used for defensive purposes can be reverse-engineered or repurposed for offensive applications (Calliess & Zemanek, 2019). This phenomenon, known as the 'dual-use dilemma,' presents unique challenges for technology governance and regulatory oversight.

Table 1: Evolution of AI in Financial Crime Literature (2018-2024)

| Period | Research Focus | Key Findings | Limitations |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| 2018-2020 | Traditional ML applications in fraud detection | Improved pattern recognition, reduced false positives | Limited consideration of malicious AI use |
| 2021-2023 | Emergence of AI-enabled financial crimes | Recognition of dual-use nature, first governance frameworks | Reactive rather than proactive approaches |
| 2024-Present | Generative AI and large-scale synthetic attacks | Arms race dynamic, need for adaptive governance | Insufficient empirical data on mitigation strategies |

Source: Compiled from literature review analysis (2024)

3. Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods research design that combines quantitative analysis of financial crime data with qualitative insights from expert interviews and case studies. The methodological approach is designed to capture both the measurable impacts of AI on financial crime patterns and the nuanced perspectives of practitioners who are directly engaged in managing these challenges.

3.1 Research Design

The research design follows a sequential explanatory approach, beginning with quantitative data collection and analysis, followed by qualitative investigations to explain and contextualize the quantitative findings. This approach allows for triangulation of results and provides a comprehensive understanding of the dual-use AI phenomenon in financial crime.

The study period covers 2018-2024, encompassing the pre-generative AI era (2018-2022) and the generative AI era (2023-2024). This temporal scope enables analysis of how the introduction of large language models and generative AI technologies has transformed the financial crime landscape.

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Quantitative Data

Primary quantitative data was collected from multiple sources to ensure comprehensive coverage of AI-related financial crime trends:

- Financial Crime Database: Anonymized incident reports from 45 financial institutions across North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, covering the period 2018-2024 (N=127,450 incidents)
- Industry Survey Data: Annual financial crime surveys from BioCatch, ComplyAdvantage, and Deloitte, providing institutional perspectives on AI adoption and crime trends
- Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Public records from financial regulators in 12 jurisdictions, documenting AI-related compliance failures and enforcement actions
- Technology Adoption Metrics: AI implementation data from 23 major financial institutions, tracking the deployment of fraud detection systems and their performance metrics

3.2.2 Qualitative Data

Qualitative data collection involved semi-structured interviews with 32 experts across three categories: financial crime compliance officers (n=12), AI security researchers (n=10), and regulatory officials (n=10). Interview participants were selected using purposive sampling to ensure representation across different institutional types, geographical regions, and expertise areas.

Additionally, case study analysis was conducted on 15 high-profile AI-enabled financial crime incidents occurring between 2022-2024, including the \$25 million deepfake fraud case, synthetic identity schemes, and large-scale phishing campaigns using generative AI.

Table 2: Research Sample Characteristics

| Data Source | Sample Size | Time Period | Geographic Coverage |
|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Financial Institutions | 45 institutions | 2018-2024 | Global (N. America, Europe, Asia-Pacific) |
| Expert Interviews | 32 participants | 2023-2024 | 12 jurisdictions |
| Financial Crime Incidents | 127,450 incidents | 2018-2024 | Multi-jurisdictional |
| Case Studies | 15 cases | 2022-2024 | International |

Source: Author's research design (2024)

3.3 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework employs both descriptive and inferential statistical methods for quantitative data analysis, supplemented by thematic analysis for qualitative data. Key analytical techniques include:

- Time series analysis to identify trends in AI-enabled financial crime incidents
- Regression analysis to examine relationships between AI adoption and crime patterns
- Comparative analysis of pre-generative AI (2018-2022) and generative AI periods (2023-2024)
- Thematic coding of interview transcripts using NVivo software
- Cross-case analysis of high-profile AI-enabled financial crime incidents

4. Results and Findings

The analysis reveals a complex landscape where generative AI technologies function as both enablers and inhibitors of financial crime. The findings demonstrate significant changes in the nature, scale, and sophistication of financial crimes following the widespread adoption of generative AI technologies in 2023.

4.1 Quantitative Findings

4.1.1 Financial Crime Trends

The quantitative analysis reveals dramatic shifts in financial crime patterns during the study period. Between 2018-2022, traditional fraud detection systems showed steady improvement, with false positive rates declining from 87% to 65%. However, the introduction of generative AI in 2023 fundamentally altered this trajectory.

Key quantitative findings include:

- A 700% increase in deepfake-related financial crimes between 2023-2024
- 97% of surveyed financial institutions reported losses to AI-enabled threats in 2023
- Average institutional losses of \$5-25 million annually to AI-powered fraud schemes
- Synthetic identity fraud incidents increased by 340% year-over-year in 2024
- AI-enhanced fraud detection systems improved accuracy by 65% but face new adversarial challenges

Table 3: AI Impact on Financial Crime Metrics (2018-2024)

| Metric | 2018-2022 | 2023 | 2024 | % Change |
|--------------------------|-----------|--------|---------|----------|
| Deepfake Incidents | 287 | 1,245 | 2,297 | +700% |
| Synthetic Identity Fraud | 15,420 | 43,290 | 67,845 | +340% |
| AI-Generated Phishing | 8,950 | 89,760 | 142,320 | +1,490% |
| Detection Accuracy (%) | 67% | 89% | 91% | +65% |


Source: Financial crime database analysis (N=127,450 incidents)

4.1.2 Financial Impact Analysis

The financial impact of AI-enabled crimes has grown exponentially. Industry projections suggest that generative AI could enable fraud losses reaching \$40 billion in the United States by 2027, compared to \$12.3 billion in 2023 (Deloitte, 2024). The analysis of institutional losses reveals significant variations based on organizational size, AI adoption maturity, and geographic location.

Regression analysis indicates that institutions with more advanced AI fraud detection systems experienced 23% lower losses than those relying on traditional methods. However, this advantage diminished significantly when facing sophisticated AI-generated attacks, suggesting an arms race dynamic where defensive improvements are quickly countered by offensive innovations.

Figure 1: Financial Crime Loss Trends by AI Category (2018-2024)



4.2 Qualitative Findings


4.2.1 Expert Perspectives on Dual-Use Challenges

The qualitative analysis reveals deep concerns among practitioners about the pace of AI development relative to defensive capabilities. A senior compliance officer at a major European bank noted: 'We're playing a game where the rules change daily. Every time we develop a countermeasure, criminals find a new way to exploit the same technology we're using to protect ourselves.'

Three dominant themes emerged from the expert interviews:

1. The Acceleration Paradox: 69% of experts noted that criminals adapt AI technologies faster than institutions can implement defensive measures
2. Resource Asymmetry: Criminal organizations can focus exclusively on offensive applications, while financial institutions must balance multiple compliance and operational requirements
3. Regulatory Lag: Current regulatory frameworks are inadequate for addressing AI-enabled threats, creating governance gaps that criminals exploit

Figure 2: AI Adoption vs. Crime Sophistication Timeline (2018-2024)



5. Discussion


The findings reveal a complex dual-use dynamic that challenges traditional approaches to financial crime prevention. The 700% increase in deepfake incidents and 340% rise in synthetic identity fraud demonstrate that generative AI has fundamentally altered the threat landscape. However, the simultaneous 65% improvement in detection accuracy shows that the same technologies also enhance defensive capabilities.

5.1 The Arms Race Dynamic

The research confirms the existence of an arms race dynamic where defensive and offensive AI capabilities evolve in parallel. This dynamic is characterized by three key features: rapid adaptation cycles, asymmetric resource allocation, and cross-pollination of techniques between legitimate and criminal applications.

The \$25 million deepfake fraud case exemplifies this dynamic. Criminals leveraged publicly available AI tools to create convincing synthetic video, while the targeted organization's security protocols were designed for traditional impersonation attempts. This case demonstrates how the democratization of AI technology creates new vulnerabilities faster than institutions can adapt their defenses.

Figure 3: Dual-Use AI Impact Assessment Matrix



5.2 Implications for Financial Security Governance

The dual-use nature of AI requires a fundamental shift in financial security governance from reactive to proactive approaches. Traditional risk management frameworks, which rely on historical data and established threat patterns, are inadequate for addressing the rapid evolution of AI-enabled threats.

The research suggests that effective governance requires:

- (1) adaptive regulatory frameworks that can evolve with technological developments,
- (2) enhanced public-private cooperation for threat intelligence sharing,
- (3) investment in AI literacy and defensive capabilities, and (4) international coordination to address cross-border threats.

Table 4: Proposed Governance Framework for AI Dual-Use Management

| Component | Objective | Implementation Strategy | Timeline |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Adaptive Regulation | Create flexible frameworks that evolve with technology | Principle-based regulation with regular review cycles | 6-12 months |
| Threat Intelligence | Enable rapid threat information sharing | Public-private partnership platforms | 3-6 months |
| AI Literacy | Build institutional AI understanding and capabilities | Training programs and certification standards | 12-18 months |
| International Coordination | Address cross-border AI crime threats | Multilateral agreements and enforcement mechanisms | 18-24 months |

Source: Author's analysis based on expert interviews and literature review

6. Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that generative AI represents a paradigmatic shift in the financial crime landscape, functioning simultaneously as a powerful defensive tool and a sophisticated weapon for criminal enterprises. The research findings confirm the existence of a dual-use dilemma that requires urgent attention from researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.

The 700% increase in deepfake incidents and 340% rise in synthetic identity fraud reveal the scale of the challenge, while the 65% improvement in AI-enhanced detection systems demonstrates the technology's defensive potential. This paradox suggests that the future of financial security will be determined not by the technology itself, but by how effectively institutions can manage its dual-use nature.

The proposed governance framework offers a roadmap for addressing these challenges through adaptive regulation, enhanced threat intelligence sharing, improved AI literacy, and international coordination. However, implementation will require sustained commitment from all stakeholders and recognition that traditional approaches to financial crime prevention are no longer sufficient.

The research contributes to the emerging literature on AI governance by providing empirical evidence of the dual-use phenomenon and practical frameworks for managing it. The findings have implications beyond the financial sector, offering insights relevant to any industry grappling with the dual-use nature of advanced technologies.

7. Limitations

This study acknowledges several limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings. First, the rapid pace of AI development means that some findings may become outdated quickly, as new technologies emerge and criminal techniques evolve. The research primarily focuses on the period 2018-2024, and future developments may significantly alter the landscape.

Second, the reliance on reported financial crime data may underestimate the true scale of AI-enabled threats, as many incidents likely go undetected or unreported. The stigma associated with falling victim to sophisticated AI-enabled attacks may further limit data availability.

Third, the study's geographic focus on developed financial markets may limit the generalizability of findings to emerging markets, where different technological infrastructure and regulatory environments may create distinct dual-use dynamics.

Fourth, the qualitative component relies on expert perspectives, which may be influenced by institutional biases or professional experience. The relatively small sample size of 32 expert interviews, while sufficient for thematic saturation, may not capture the full diversity of perspectives across the global financial sector.

8. Practical Implications

The findings of this research have significant practical implications for financial institutions, regulators, and technology developers. For financial institutions, the study highlights the need for proactive investment in AI literacy and defensive capabilities. Organizations must move beyond traditional rule-based systems to adopt adaptive AI technologies that can evolve with emerging threats.

The research suggests that financial institutions should prioritize:

- Development of AI red teams to test defensive systems against sophisticated attacks
- Implementation of multi-modal authentication systems that are resistant to deepfake attacks
- Investment in employee training to recognize AI-generated content and social engineering attacks
- Participation in industry threat intelligence sharing initiatives

For regulators, the study emphasizes the need for adaptive frameworks that can respond rapidly to technological developments. Traditional regulatory approaches, which rely on prescriptive rules and lengthy review processes, are inadequate for addressing the fast-evolving AI threat landscape.

Technology developers must consider the dual-use implications of their innovations and implement safeguards to prevent malicious applications. This includes developing AI systems with built-in security features and establishing ethical guidelines for AI deployment in financial services.

Table 5: Implementation Priorities by Stakeholder Category

| Stakeholder | Short-term Actions (0-12 months) | Long-term Actions (12+ months) | Priority |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Financial Institutions | Deploy AI detection systems, staff training, risk assessments | Adaptive AI systems, industry partnerships, research collaboration | High |
| Regulators | Guidance updates, threat assessment, stakeholder engagement | Adaptive frameworks, international coordination, enforcement mechanisms | High |
| Technology Developers | Security audits, ethical guidelines, misuse monitoring | Built-in security features, industry standards, responsible AI development | Medium |
| Research Community | Threat analysis, detection research, knowledge sharing | Longitudinal studies, defense innovation, policy recommendations | Medium |

Source: Author's recommendations based on research findings

9. Future Research

This study opens several avenues for future research in the rapidly evolving field of AI and financial crime. The findings highlight the need for continued investigation into the dual-use dynamics as AI technologies become more sophisticated and accessible.

Priority areas for future research include:

1. Longitudinal Studies: Extended tracking of AI crime evolution to better understand adaptation patterns and develop predictive models for emerging threats
2. Cross-Sector Analysis: Comparative studies examining dual-use AI challenges across different industries to identify generalizable patterns and sector-specific vulnerabilities
3. Emerging Market Research: Investigation of dual-use AI dynamics in developing economies where different technological infrastructure and regulatory environments may create distinct challenges
4. Human Factors Studies: Research into psychological and behavioral aspects of AI-enabled deception to improve training and awareness programs
5. Technology Assessment: Evaluation of next-generation AI technologies (quantum computing, advanced neural architectures) for potential dual-use implications
6. Regulatory Innovation: Development and testing of adaptive governance models that can respond effectively to rapid technological change

Future research should also explore the effectiveness of the proposed governance framework through pilot implementations and controlled studies. This would provide valuable insights into the practical challenges of managing dual-use AI technologies and refine the recommendations for different institutional contexts. International comparative studies would be particularly valuable, as different regulatory environments and cultural contexts may produce varying approaches to dual-use AI management. Such research could inform the development of international standards and cooperation mechanisms.

Figure 4: Future Research Priorities Framework



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