The Ontological Status of Social Constructs and the Myth of Objectivity in Social Inquiry

Abstract

This article investigates the enduring tension within the social sciences between the acknowledgment of social phenomena as constructed realities and the continued pursuit of objective knowledge. It argues that the conventional positivist model of objectivity, often implicitly adopted, is fundamentally incompatible with the nature of the social world. In its place, this paper proposes a revised framework for objectivity grounded in a critical realist ontology. This approach provides a philosophically robust foundation for social inquiry by affirming the real, causal power of social constructs while simultaneously recognizing their dependence on human practices and institutions. By deconstructing the "myth of objectivity" as a value-free "view from nowhere," the article advances a conception of objectivity rooted in the rigor of the research process and the critical engagement of the scientific community. Through an examination of foundational theories in social ontology and a synthesis with the methodological principles of critical realism, this paper outlines a path for the social sciences that avoids the twin pitfalls of scientism and relativism, ultimately affirming the potential for a critical and objective science of the social.